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Monday 29 May 2017

An Essay that could go much deeper on "Evolutionary Debunking" of Morality and those Psychologists who think that Science can tell us about Meta-ethics

4. How reliable is moral cognition? Does evolution debunk morality?

Evolution does not “debunk morality” (a stupid and annoying phrase). Hume gave the main arguments debunking strong (non-teleology-based) moral objectivism long before Darwin. Evolution put the final nail in the coffin of teleological metaphysics, which further reinforced the importance of Hume’s arguments, and 20th Century work in evolutionary biology, ethology, evolutionary psychology and (evolutionary) neuroscience has helped bring out the important implications of the fact that our ‘moral faculty’ is at least grounded in a limbic system and norm-generator that have their specific form only because this form has been selected for. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to claim that these discoveries have had earth-shattering conclusions for meta-ethics: they have not shown that a Mackean Error Theory or some form of expressivism is the correct account of human moral language, because they have not shown that it is impossible to reason about ethics. I argue that, in roughly the same way that we accept that knowledge of evolution does not “debunk” mathematics, we ought to accept that knowledge of evolution does not “debunk” the grand philosophical tradition of reasoning about ethics, from Plato to Parfit (or show that we should give up debating ethical dilemmas).[1] 

Long before Darwin, David Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature famously argued: a) that one can’t deduce a prescription from any number of descriptive statements, b) that beliefs are not in themselves motivating and c) that it is a category error to think that desires or preferences are rational or irrational in themselves. The first is a straightforward logical truth,[2] with (of course) extremely important consequences for very naïve views about ethics. Nevertheless, the observation of this logical truth was not fatal to full-blooded moral objectivism for scientific rationalists before Darwin, because a pre-Darwinian scientific rationalist could still rationally believe in some kind of teleological metaphysics. In fact, most pre-Darwinian Enlightenment figures did believe in some kind of teleological metaphysics (either taking the form of Christianity (like Newton, Locke or Kant) or some kind of Deism (like Spinoza or Voltaire)). Galileo and Newton had obviously shown that Aristotle’s teleological physics was hopelessly flawed, but their theories hadn’t shown that there could not be purpose in creation. Newton certainly didn’t think he had shown that!
However, as philosophers have been pointing out for more than a century, with Darwin’s theory of evolution came the deathblow to the ancient Aristotelian worldview that design was inherent in nature (that, e.g., the undeniable telos of Man, “the rational animal”, is to be a zoon politikon who fully exercises his powers of reason and attains eudaimonia). This is because Darwin showed that all appearance of design in nature was just that: teleonomy, not teleology, because all life evolved from completely unconscious processes over very long stretches of time. This conclusion destroys any claim for the objectivity of teleological ethics, thereby rendering unjustifiable arguments from “the natural” for or against actions or practices.[3] 
Without any contribution from an understanding of evolution, b) and c) do further violence, if true, to naïve ethical views, because they jointly imply the conclusions i) that even if there were absolutely ‘true’ moral judgments which all sufficiently intelligent species would eventually converge on, an omniscient (and logically omniscient) organism could recognise these ‘true’ judgments and act monstrously nevertheless, because of a lack of motivation to do good, and ii) that it would be a category error to think that this lack of motivation would be in itself rational or irrational. Although the most extreme Humean view on rationality of preferences certainly runs into trouble (because having an intransitive preference set seems clearly irrational and because, as Derek Parfit showed [1984, 2011], one can at least come up with niche examples of arbitrary, self-defeating preferences that seem clearly irrational by any standard), a slightly moderated version seems basically impossible to deny. Pertinently, Darwin’s theory gave this line of thought a further power, by bringing out the massive historical contingency of our feelings towards con-specifics. In The Descent of Man, Darwin himself illustrates this point: 
“In the same manner as various animals have some sense of beauty, though they admire widely different objects, so they might have a sense of right and wrong, though led by it to follow widely different lines of conduct. If […] men were reared under precisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters.” [Darwin, 1981/1871: 73]
The basic thought here is that different species have different limbic systems and different forms of social cognition (mainly(?)) because of different historical trajectories, and that there’s no basis for the intuition that one kind of limbic system or form of social cognition produces the true judgments (whereas there is an obvious basis for thinking that having a bigger neocortex may allow for better reasoning, etc).
Since the middle of the 20th Century, a huge amount of progress has been made in the fields of theoretical evolutionary biology, ethology (particularly primatology), social psychology and neuroscience towards understanding the evolutionary ‘roots’ of our moral faculty and the way people commonly make ethical judgments (the role of reason). Some have claimed that some of this research has dramatic meta-ethical conclusions. I disagree. In the short space I have left, I will do my best to show that this is the wrong inference.
In the introduction, my words suggested that I was mostly concerned with those who have used Darwinian research to argue either for an Error Theory about ethics or some form of expressivism, but there’s actually another, more interesting group who have used this research for a strong meta-ethical conclusion: utilitarians like Peter Singer, Joshua Greene and (possibly) Steven Pinker who think that theoretical evolutionary biology and psychology show a) that we rely on gut intuitions which we rationalise constantly, but that this is specifically a failure to think in consequentialist terms, b) that a rational person ought to become a utilitarian, and c) that ‘reason’ is the main engine of moral progress, where moral progress is basically identified with “expanding the moral circle”. This argument is expounded in greatest detail by Greene in his 2013 book Moral Tribes, although Singer’s well-cited 2005 paper “Ethics and Intuitions” instantiates this argument as well. Quite apart from the simplistic science that is often marshalled in service of this argument (see my first assignment on “Ethics and Intuitions”)[4], it is a category mistake, as Massimo Pigliucci [2012] and Thomas Nagel [2013] argue, to think that empirical research could in itself strongly favour one moral theory over another. Of course, Singer and Greene realise that they also need a philosophical argument to support their interpretation of this evidence – however, like Pigliucci and Nagel, I believe that their arguments fall short of establishing their very strong conclusion that utilitarianism is the ‘true theory’, or the one sensible choice for a rationalist.
As Nagel points out in his 2013 review of Moral Tribes, “You can’t learn about morality from brain science”, there appears to be a contradiction in Greene’s position. On the one hand, Greene does not want to say that utilitarianism is the true theory, i.e. taking a strong realist stance, (as Singer has in recent times been strongly tempted towards [2016]) and yet his advocacy of a sub-Millian utilitarianism with principles that are deeply counterintuitive and unfollowable – which even Greene admits he doesn’t come close to following – strongly suggests the view, as Nagel puts it, that morality is something “more […] than human”. Why a non-realist would hold such a view is inexplicable. Moreover, as Nagel suggests, it is strongly contrary to available evidence to hold that deontic principles can’t form the basis for a universal human ethic, as we can see in the phenomenal international success of ‘human rights’ since World War II [Pinker, 2011 (funnily enough)]. Like Singer, therefore, Greene does not have the grounds he thinks he has to repudiate a more Rawlsian approach to ethical reasoning, without the extreme ambition of de-humanising ethics.
More generally, I think that one thing that unites this utilitarian group of Greene et al, and the as-yet-undiscussed group who use Darwinian research to defend some form of strong anti-rationalism (represented by Haidt) is that they infer from evidence that a massive amount of “rationalisation” goes on in the production of moral judgments by non-philosophers [Haidt, 2012] that major philosophical debates must boil down merely to a clash between very elaborate competing rationalisations. I myself believe that Haidt’s research casts serious doubt on some of the basic assumptions that motivated many great philosophers (e.g. Kant), but I also think there is much of importance that it doesn’t cast doubt on. It doesn’t cast doubt on the fact that human beings can’t change their mind when exposed to moral reasons (in the Rawlsian sense), nor that an astute philosopher can’t tell when a person’s commitment to abstract principle x is in conflict with their position on specific issue y.
Moreover, as Pigliucci points out [2012], one needn’t believe in the ‘truth’ of one moral theory to believe in the possibility of making progress with ethical reasoning. One can, like Pigliucci and I, believe that different frameworks can be applied to different problems. In short, it is not inconsistent with Hume, Darwin or modern psychological and neuroscientific research to advocate a weak form of moral rationalism, which would be committed to the view that certain points of consensus among modern philosophers have much to do with reason (that extreme speciesism is a mistake, that racism and sexism are wrong), but not committed to the view that all issues or dilemmas have a determinate, superassertible verdict which all rational people must accept, or that there is one ultimate theory which all rational people should ultimately converge towards, contra Derek Parfit [2011].






Reference List

Aitken, Thomas (2017). “First Assignment for How Biology Matters to Philosophy: Report”. Accessible (if need be) from:
<http://writingsoftclaitken.blogspot.com.au/2017/04/a-brief-philosophy-of-biology.html>

Darwin, Charles (1981/1871). The Descent of Man, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Greene, Joshua (2013). Moral Tribes, Penguin Press.

Haidt, Jonathan (2012). The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion, Pantheon Press.

Hume, David (1737). A Treatise of Human Nature, 1992 edition, Prometheus Books, New York.

Nagel, Thomas (2013). “You can’t learn about morality from brain scans”, New Republic. Accessible from:
<https://newrepublic.com/article/115279/joshua-greenes-moral-tribes-reviewed-thomas-nagel>

Parfit, Derek (2011). On What Matters, Oxford University Press.

Pigliucci, Massimo (2012). Answers for Aristotle, Basic Books, New York.

Priest, Graham (1997). “Sexual perversion”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75:3, 360-372.

Turchin, Peter (2005). War and Peace and War, Penguin US.

Turchin, Peter (2015). Ultrasociety: How 10,000 Years of War Made Humans the Best Co-operators on Earth, Beresta Books.





[1] Knowledge of evolution can help us see that some of the great moral philosophers were more seriously mistaken about various matters than others, with the teleological philosophers (like Plato and his fellow ancients) the most fundamentally mistaken about what can reasonably be said to justify moral claims. The view I will defend is simply that ethical reasoning is not always faux-reasoning or rationalising in the sense that the best ethical reasoners in the philosophical tradition really are deriving conclusions directly from the axioms (general ethical principles) they set up (the constraint on possible axioms is just that any axiom has to seem very appealing to (at least most of) us).
[2] Easy to overlook, of course, because so much of our language is normatively infused, as Hilary Putnam argued (I don’t have time to argue that it would be wrong to think that the linguistic ‘entanglement’ shows that Hume’s ‘guillotine’ is unjustified).
[3] A brief contemporary discussion of this point can be found in Graham Priest’s 1997 paper Sexual Perversion, which points out that to a Darwinian and moral rationalist moral objections using language like “perversion” and “unnatural” carry no weight: if by natural you mean historically adaptive and selected for, then the objection doesn’t go through because a behaviour’s historical adaptiveness has no logical bearing on its rightness or wrongness (this is more or less Hume or G.E. Moore re-hashed).
[4] Pinker, perhaps Singer’s main influence and very much a proponent of the gene-centric theory of evolution, seems unaware of the evidence that Hobbes’ description of ‘human nature’ matches only about 25% of the population in experiments of co-operation games (including outside the West) [Turchin 2005], generally overlooks the massive historical and sociological evidence that people can be highly self-sacrificing for what Atran calls “sacred values” [2001] (though Pinker in The Better Angels of our Nature does cite Atran in relation to Israel-Palestine), and seems unaware of the case for multilevel group selection as an explanation of human ‘ultrasociality’, as articulated, for example, in Turchin [2005, 2015].

Thursday 25 May 2017

Persistence and Personal Identity

On Persistence and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics and how this bears on Personal Identity

‘Most people think that they have a ‘self’ that persists over long stretches of time, through significant psychological (and physical) changes. Is this belief justifiable?’

The answer to the question is ‘No, it is a religious commitment, in the sense that it is a belief that makes no sense when logically analysed which nevertheless plays a massive role in our lives, society and culture’. This response may seem overly tendentious, but I see it as unavoidable.[1] In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume discusses the question of personal identity in a broader defence of an error theory about identity of macroscopic particulars over time. I submit that Hume’s fairly short discussion of these issues in this book is better than that of leading late-20th Century four-dimensionalist metaphysicians like W.V.O Quine, David Lewis and Theodore Sider (and better from a four-dimensionalist’s perspective). I believe this because I think Hume fully embraces the view that the way we commonly think and talk about individuals or particulars in the world is not based on an accurate understanding of reality, which I believe to be true. In this essay, I will argue that Hume is right that there are no concrete entities in our (speaking loosely) Heraclitean world which persist numerically identically through time[2]; that Hume is right to see humans or other living creatures as, as far as persistence is concerned, not very metaphysically different from other living (and even non-living) macroscopic objects; that he is right that we “confound […] “numerical and specific identity [qualitative identity or close resemblance] […] and in our thinking and reasoning employ one for the other” [Hume, 1736: Book II, Section VI]; and that he is right to position himself as a relativist or normativist about accounts of personal identity, a position which opens up the conceptual possibility for attempting to adopt a different – perhaps morally and emotionally superior [Parfit, 1984; Schopenhauer 1818-19] – religious commitment than the conventional ‘endurantist’-type religious commitment.

I’ll begin this essay by trying my best to briefly stake out the neologistic vocabulary that I have decided to use to try to express my Humean position on ‘identity of objects over time’ (a position whose popularity obviously isn’t helped by the fact that it’s very hard to think about and articulate). I think that the language we use to talk about (at least) macroscopic particulars/individuals – i.e. objects or things which are concrete, living or not, i.e. not species or types – is metaphysically in error, because we talk as if there don’t just solidly exist instant-instances (instance-time slices) of species or sorts, but as if there solidly exist properly persistent instances of sorts (“the [extended-through-time] cow”, “the apple”, “the tree”, “that shoe”) – which is false.[3] But saying that this is false raises a universe of problems. Further disambiguation becomes overwhelmingly difficult, because we are bogged down in a language which in its fundamental conceptual structure contradicts what we are trying to convey.
One thing I can happily say that we can ascribe properties to instant-instances of sorts. But I certainly do not want to say that we have to radically rethink the nature of sorts themselves so that they become merely abstract groupings of intrinsically similar instant-instances; making this kind of revision would be very undesirable. The more important point is that it would be unnecessary: we can accept that the ontology we use in everyday language, as well as in the biological and social sciences (and the chemical sciences too, but I want to stick to the ‘macroscopic’) is not God’s ontology (let ‘representationalism’, as Huw Price [2013] uses the term, be damned), because, whilst sorts may or may not be as real or more fundamental than instant-instances (Platonism versus nominalism is still perfectly alive), there is no question that persistent individuals do not exist as fundamentally as instant-instances – and yet all of our sorts collect together these imaginary entities. (It would still be a useful and important project to attempt to give an account of how you can save a non-extreme-reductionist ontology while accepting that there do not exist persistent individuals, but this is a short essay; one crutch is that a proponent of my position can still talk about evolution patterns of instant-instances with similar intrinsics, and therefore avoid weird conclusions like that early embryos of mammals should all be grouped together because they’re all intrinsically very similar when they’re early embryos (ignoring DNA differences).)
Onto the argument.
In Section IV Part VI of A Treatise of Human Nature, “Of Personal Identity”, Hume points out some childishly simple empirical facts about the way living humans undergo change:
“Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment.” [Hume, 1894/1736: 134].
These suffice to show that the notion of “some philosophers” that for each person there exists one entity called a “Self” of “perfect identity and simplicity” has no basis in reality, and thus that there is not really such a thing (in exactly the same sense that there is not really such a thing as ghosts) [133].
Like me, Hume doesn’t think that humans are metaphysically special in terms of persistence, and it is therefore natural that after observing that the endurantist notion of the Self has no basis in reality, he quickly moves onto a deeper discussion of how our untutored thoughts about the persistence of “animals and plants” (and even non-living macroscopic ‘things’, one notices) lead us to an “absurdity”.
As he explains, “Our propension to confound identity with relation is so great, that we are apt to imagine something unknown and mysterious, connecting the parts, beside their relation.” [135]. 
For those who are concerned about such things, he also observes correctly that “the controversy concerning identity is not merely a dispute of words” because “when we attribute identity, in an improper sense [the numerical sense], to variable or interrupted objects [collections of causally related object-instances which become increasingly different with distance across the 4-d block], our mistake is not confin’d to the expression, but is commonly attended with a fiction, either of something invariable and uninterrupted, or of something mysterious and inexplicable.” [135].
As Hume’s words imply, the burden of proof lies on the mystic or lunatic who claims there is numerical identity between instance-instants with different properties, not on the person who points out that there is unambiguously not (or that you don’t really mean numerical identity).

A natural response by a perdurantist or stage theorist to this would be to protest that I’m ‘copping out’ of actually giving my own account of persistence or personal identity, and with no overwhelmingly compelling reason to do so: after all, my radical Humean empiricism has massive costs in severing too violently the connection between language and reality, in the process laying waste to canonical theories of reference and also popular Quinean notions about ontological commitment. However, the truth is that Lewis’ perdurantism and Theodore Sider’s stage theory are pointless, since they don’t actually give an account of our concept of personal identity, but something completely different (for no reason, since they’re also not descriptions of anything in reality).[4] As David Braddon-Mitchell has suggested [real-life], in the ordinary speech of human time-slices, sometimes the time-slices (if we’re talking about big enough time-slices that there is ‘room’ to utter a sentence) use the word “I” to mean the nearby time-slices which will soon emerge from them (“I really want to get drunk”) – a kind of usage for which the stage theory sort of ‘accounts’ – and yet human time-slices often also think of themselves as collections of lots of the time-slices to which they are causally connected, even though these time-slices are very different (“I’ve had a good life”, “She’s a good person”), a usage which very roughly aligns with the perdurantist account of persons as four-dimensional ‘worms’. I say the latter only very roughly aligns with the perdurantist account of persons because, in truth, the perdurantist account of persons doesn’t nicely line up with any part of our everyday talk. Four-dimensional worms are not agents who perform actions, nor do they have responsibilities, nor do they speak or act or think, nor do they have memories, and so on.
The non-perdurantist David Wiggins makes a similar kind of argument against perdurantism, in slightly more high-falutin’ language: “Anything that is part of a Lesniewskian sum [a mereological whole defined by its parts] is necessarily part of it…But no person or normal material object is necessarily in the total state that will correspond to the person- or object-moment postulated by the theory under discussion” [1980: 168]. This is a way of saying that the ‘4-D worm persons’ have very different modal properties from persons as we naturally think of them. We want to say that “I might have done this” or “I might have been this” but if what “I” is is really a worm all of whose temporal parts are necessary components, then one is forced to turn to the analysis of such sentences that Lewis himself turned to: “there is a world in which a counterpart of mine might have done this”. [Lewis, 1971: 205]
This is clearly not intuitive!

After Hume has finished pointing out that that our fundamental way of breaking up the world as a set of environments populated by individuals which persist over time has no reality, he makes a strong relativist claim about the nature of philosophical disputes about what It takes for “survival” or continuity of the “Self”: “As the relations, and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity.” [139]. This claim falls straight out of accepting the Humean view of the unreality of persistence. There is good reason to think that the psychological continuity-and-connectedness account of personal ‘identity’ is, overall, a better account of what we typically think it takes for survival than the physical continuity account [Nichols S & Bruno M, 2010], but no reason to say one is True: they’re both just ways of thinking about what people generally think matters about our existence.
As this human instance-instant suggested in the introduction, this human instance-instant thinks it’s more liberating and morally desirable (and ‘in tune with reality’ in at least a weak sense) to try to jettison attachment to the idea that there is a fixed “you” and to instead focus more on being ‘at one’ with sentient life. Many mystics and philosophers have held this kind of view, as is well-known. Arthur Schopenhauer in The World as Will and Representation advocated that we are all tiny parts of the great universal force-of-striving known as “the Will”, and that to achieve tranquillity, enlightenment, freedom and pure knowledge (self-consciously analogous for Schopenhauer to Buddhist nirvana) we must engage in a heroic struggle to try to become at one with the universal Will against our own will-to-live, manifest in our base and animalistic instincts and impulses. Such a philosophy led him to write many magnificent passages like the following:
 “This freeing of [“pure, will-less”] knowledge lifts us as wholly and entirely away from [the individual will], as do sleep and dreams; happiness and unhappiness have disappeared; we are no longer individual; the individual is forgotten; we are only pure subject of knowledge; we are only that one eye of the world which looks out from all knowing creatures, but which can become perfectly free from the service of will in man alone. Thus all difference of individuality so entirely disappears, that it is all the same whether the perceiving eye belongs to a mighty king or to a wretched beggar; for neither joy nor complaining can pass that boundary with us.” [1909/ 1818/19, Vol I: 262].
Derek Parfit’s most famous passage from Reasons and Persons concerns the feeling of liberation he received from realising that there is not really any such thing as a persistent Self, the moral virtue it helped him acquire, and the reduction in his fear of death it brought about:
“When I believed that my existence was such a further fact, I seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more concerned about the lives of others.
When I believed the Non-Reductionist View, I also cared more about my inevitable death.  After my death, there will be no one living who will be me. I can now redescribe this fact.  […] My death will break the more direct relations between my present experiences and future experiences, but it will not break various other relations.  This is all there is to the fact that there will be no one living who will be me.  Now that I have seen this, my death seems to me less bad.” [1984: 281].

In summary, I think Hume was right: there are no persistent individuals, and there is no spooky Self which somehow preserves numerical identity between different human time slices. From this, it follows, as Hume saw, that conflicts over accounts of personal identity are essentially conflicts over what people think matters. From this basis, in turn, one can see that it may be morally and emotionally good for many people to try to weaken their endurantist intuitions.









Reference List

Hume, David (1737). A Treatise of Human Nature, 1992 edition, Prometheus Books, New York.
Lewis, David (1971). “Counterparts of persons and their bodies”, Journal of Philosophy, 68 (7): 203-211.

Nichols, Shaun & Bruno, Michael (2010). “Intuitions about personal identity: An empirical study”, Philosophical Psychology, 23 (3): 293-312.

Parfit, Derek (1984). Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1909/ 1818/19). Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, trans. R.B. Haldane and J. Kemp. Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co, London.

Wiggins, David (1980). Sameness and Substance, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

Uncited:

Gallois, Andre, "Identity Over Time", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/identity-time/>.

Noonan, Harold and Curtis, Ben, "Identity", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/identity/>.

Hawley, Katherine, "Temporal Parts", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/temporal-parts/>.





[1] And what is this “I”? This human instance-instant (instance-instant of the kind “human”) doesn’t know. Every time the human-instance instant (or human ‘time slice’) typing the words uses the first-person pronoun in this essay he (the instance-instant with male sex) means “the human instance-instant typing the words”.
[2] Not being an ontological Quinean, in the sense of believing in the project of trying to construct a ‘flat’ ontology (or literally any other Quinean doctrine), I more mean to say that particulars which persist numerically through time, if we want to say they exist because it’s convenient, are clearly less fundamental – dependent on the instant-instances – and are also ontologically posterior to the abstract sorts (it seems to me that I’m basically forced to the latter view by adopting the former, though I won’t elaborate on that point because I don’t have space).
[3] I’ll later make an argument for this. The high modality is explained by the fact that I think this is obviously true. I should probably temper these sentiments in light of concerns about disagreement of epistemic peers.
[4] This may be too harsh… Probably: I’m only 20.

Wednesday 17 May 2017

Solving Race!

Unpacking Complexities on the Issue of Genetics and Race, with some Links to the Best Recent Philosophy-of-Biology Papers on the Subject

Let me begin this post by making something very important very clear: the topic of race is an extremely messy and complicated one. If you can’t articulate what a heritability score is (how it’s computed, using what kinds of studies, why legs have a heritability score of 0), if you have no clue what a “reaction norm” is, if you don’t understand the clinal variation of human groups, if you don’t know anything about palaeoanthropology and how human genetics compares to that of other species, if you don’t know about how taxonomical classification of subspecies works in other species,  if you don’t know about the Flynn Effect, if you haven’t read Guns, Germs and Steel (not to imply that it’s a flawless book ), and if you have no experience with philosophy of biology or analytic metaphysics (I think this is probably the most important), you really should shut the fuck up until you meet these criteria (yes, all of them). You cannot importantly contribute to a serious debate about race if you do not meet these criteria. You will be talking totally at cross-purposes to those who do, and without realising it (that is, you will be suffering from the very common ailment known as the ‘pretence of knowledge’).

Some people say that to say that races are unreal or that race is a social construction is muddle-headed on basically any construal. Two articles that position themselves rhetorically against all views that fall under the label of “social constructionism about race” , and argue that modern genetics shows that we can non-sophistically and non-essentialistically say that race is biological are the paper “The Social Destruction of a Biological Concept” by the philosopher Neven Sesardic (https://philpapers.org/rec/SESRAS) and this long blogpost from the very prominent (on the internet) genetics researcher Razib Khan (http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2013/05/why-race-as-a-biological-construct-matters/#.WR0CzWh942w). Sesardic is an anti-leftist polemicist who sees much of what philosophers and scientists say about race as politically rooted. His paper first appeared in the March 2010 issue of the journal Biology and Philosophy, and it has since been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. While it is a flawed paper in several different respects (as we will see, when I discuss Hochman’s and Pigliucci’s () replies (https://philpapers.org/rec/HOCATN; https://philpapers.org/rec/PIGWAW )), it is possibly the best recent philosophical defence of ‘racial naturalism’.
Now, I should immediately point out that Sesardic’s diction in the conclusion of the paper suggests that he does not want to be yoked to a strong label like racial naturalism (“My aim in this paper was not to prove the biological reality of race,” he pleads)  (I think that the rhetorical strategy behind this is to position himself as the sane, sober moderate), but he makes very clear throughout the paper that he doesn’t like any variation of the account of race as a “social construction” and strongly disagrees with academics who are perfectly happy to acknowledge the same genetic data and facts about skull morphology and IQ that he makes reference to (meaning that the difference lies in the metaphysics).  It is therefore hard to think of a better label (he clearly thinks there is a substantive disagreement at work; he is not merely saying that the rhetoric of his opponents (Naomi Zack, Dick Lewontin, Phillip Kitcher, Anthony Appiah, Sally Haslanger, Jared Diamond, etc) is misleading).
Khan’s article is not as strong as Sesardic’s; it would be erroneous to say that Khan defends a position that one would call ‘racial naturalism’. In fact, echoing the Kitcher quote that Hochman cites in his reply to Sesardic, Khan writes:
“From a scientific perspective in biology there are not ultimate and fundamental taxonomic facts. There are simply useful ideas and concepts to illustrate and explore the objective phenomena of the natural world. The Species Concepts debate shows us this reality well, as even species can be tendentious. But the debate often shakes out along disciplinary lines. Many more ecological scientists seem to be taken by the ecological species concept, while evolutionary geneticists are more keen on the biological species concept. That is because they are choosing the framework most useful for their ends. There is nothing “Post Modern” in this in that it denies reality. Rather, we are disputing the ideas which we use to capture the essence of real phenomena in compact semantic relations suitable for symbolic representation (whether with math or language).”
Another difference between his and Sesardic’s articles is that Khan is not positioning himself explicitly against fellow academic experts, but against the totally genetically uninformed and very weakly defended racial constructionism of the “literary intellectual” Ta-Nehisi Coates. The reason I grouped these articles together at all is simply because they both don’t really acknowledge the key point that Hochman makes, which goes as follows:
“The metaphysical problem [that “there is a nondenumerable infinity of possible accurate maps we could draw for our planet” [Kitcher, 2007: 209]] is best illustrated by its practical counterpart. Racial labels may be more or less useful proxies for biological variation in different scientific disciplines, and each discipline may support racial naturalism or social constructionism to a greater or lesser extent. It is crucial that these points be separated. For instance, forensic anthropologists are able to allocate skulls, with fairly high accuracy, to the racialized group with which the deceased would have been identified. Does this show that racial labels are useful proxies for biological variation in physical forensic anthropology? Yes. Does this support racial naturalism? No. Why? Because forensic anthropologists translate trait measurements to the “racial” taxonomies societies use, or would have used, to describe missing persons; they do not generally ask whether those taxonomies are scientifically valid. When they do it is in a research context, and their answer is firmly negative.[footnote 21, citing this: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ajpa.21006/abstract] Forensic anthropologists are also able to allocate skulls to groups that are separated culturally, linguistically, politically, and historically, and at a finer grain than a racial taxonomy offers. “Race” latches on to human morphological variation, but in a crude way. Forensic anthropologists use racial classification, but this is because we, the public, classify our missing persons racially, not because it is a precise or privileged representation of human morphological diversity.
The debate between race naturalists and social constructionists is best framed not as a dichotomy, nor a continuum, but as a discussion worth having in various scientific, philosophical, and political contexts. This discussion may one day end in eliminativism about race. In the meantime, the social constructionist will expect correlations between racialized groups and various traits. Yet she will, in Gannett’s words, expect such correlations to be “statistical not universal, local not global, contingent not necessary, and accidental not lawful, and expect their corresponding cuts in nature to be interest-relative not mind-independent, dynamic not static, indeterminate not determinate, many not few, overlapping not nonoverlapping, and superficial not deep.”[footnote 22, citing the Gannett quote]”
As I made clear, what Hochman is saying here has parallels in Khan’s own words, but the key point made here that Khan fails to draw attention to and Sesardic totally omits is this: that if another species had the same group differences as our species does, we would not feel the need to come up with categories in any way paralleling our racial categories. As Hochman later argues, and as Pigliucci argues in his excellent reply, modern genetic evidence is firmly against the conclusion that human races rise to the level of subspecies, according to the criteria we apply to other species. Wright’s Fixation Index, or the FST, which compares the genetic variation within one or more sub-populations to the amount of variation within the total population using single-locus comparisons (this means (I think) comparing single-nucleotide polymorphisms, as it were, 'one by one', rather than looking for more complicated correlations between multiple loci), is the technique used for sub-species determination, with an FST of 0.25 the arbitrarily defined sufficient level for the demarcation of a subspecies. Lewontin’s famous 1972 study “The Apportionment of Human Diversity” showed that, according to this kind of standard, there’s no way you could say our species has a subspecies. Now, as Pigliucci and Hochman discuss (because Sesardic discusses this point, and because Khan possibly nods to it in his use of genetic-clustering data), it is often claimed that Lewontin committed a “fallacy” (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Genetic_Diversity:_Lewontin%27s_Fallacy) in inferring anything about the metaphysics of race from a single-locus study (the claim is that it makes sense to look at correlations between lots of loci than just compare this locus in individual A to that locus in individual B), when genetic-clustering studies have since shown that, e.g. ‘Africans’ stick out from the rest of us (although ‘Africans’, if you want to isolate them as a population group (arbitrarily, remember), have significantly more internal genetic diversity than ‘Europeans’ or ‘South East Asians’ (two more arbitrarily isolated population groups)).
Of course, calling this a fallacy is simply an abuse of language; it is no such thing. And here’s what Pigliucci says about the genetic-clustering studies themselves, and how they are abused by people like Sesardic:
“The Rosenberg et al. paper is a study of 52 human populations, whose genetic diversity was characterized using 377 autosomal (i.e., not sex-linked) microsatellite loci scored in 1056 individuals. It is by all means a large sample of genetic variation, and its empirical conclusions are robust (Rosenberg et al., 2005). The significance of the Rosenberg et al. study for Sesardic is that it “did allow an inference of group structure and that, furthermore, five clusters derived from that analysis of purely genetic similarities corresponded largely to major geographic regions” (Sesardic, 2010, p. 153). Yes, but this is an interestingly (and possibly revealing) exercise in selective quotation on Sesardic’s part.
First off, Rosenberg et al. actually found a variable number of major clusters (6, 5, 4 and even 3), depending at what level one stops the analysis. Why pick a particular one as the major finding of the paper, other than because five clusters happen to fit the author’s predilection for the true number of human races? At the very least this is blatant cherry picking of the relevant evidence. Second, and far more damning, Sesardic entirely ignores that Rosenberg and colleagues go on to say (even in the abstract of their paper!) that “we identified … subclusters that often correspond to individual populations.” Are each and all of these subclusters also races, in Sesardic’s opinion? One assumes not, but Sesardic has not given us any compelling reason to think that K = 5 is the racial level because his own basic meaning of ‘race’ (a genetically identifiable cluster of individuals) is compatible with multiple levels of human population substructure. Under a referentialist semantic framework this suggests that ‘race’ as intended by Sesardic has no referent, not that ‘race’ refers to K = 5 but not to K = 6, 4, 3 etc.
What of Tang et al.’s paper? Sesardic summarizes its import thus: “A group of researchers led by geneticist Neil Risch et al., (2002) analyzed genetic data for 326 microsatellite markers on a sample of 3636 subjects from the United States and Taiwan. The subjects identified themselves as belonging to one of the four racial groups (white, African American, East Asian and Hispanic). The genetic cluster analysis of the data produced four major clusters, whose correspondence with the four self reported races was near-perfect: the genetic cluster membership and self-identified race coincided in as many as 99.9% of the cases.” Besides the fact that there are specific methodological issues with the Tang et al.’s survey (if one looks closely at their sample, one realizes that all of their Hispanics are Mexican Americans from a single county in Texas, which makes the otherwise surprising “Hispanic” cluster a reflection of mere geographical proximity), again, one can identify legitimate genetic clusters of human populations at a variety of hierarchical levels, but Sesardic offers no principled reason for identifying one such clustering as more fundamentally indicative of races.
So, yes, there is structured genetic variation in human populations. But this is hardly a surprising or controversial notion among human population geneticists, and it does not at all imply any strong correspondence between the available genetic data and folk concepts of races.”
So what does this all mean? It means that we are ‘working backwards’ in a really important sense when we use genetic-clustering studies to bring out genetic differences between human groups that seem in some incredibly rough sense to correspond to our ‘folk’ ideas.

In conclusion, it’s not cool – and philosophically wrongheaded – to be a ‘race realist’. (Incidentally, Charles Murray is acknowledged at the end of Sesardic’s paper, which means this becomes yet another wonderful opportunity to slag off that total piece of shit Sam Harris, who, I am told, did not press Murray on anything when he invited him onto his podcast (doing his usual thing of arrogantly asserting completely false and asinine things on some subject on which he has zero expertise)).


**Postcript, 16th October 2017: just found this: http://bactra.org/weblog/520.html

Friday 5 May 2017

I just changed my blog title again

I don't know if that will hurt my stats, which have been improving recently. I was thinking of changing the title to "Levels of Abstraction". Don't ask me why (partly because I do computer science now and all that). But this is better given that what I write mostly about is how worried I am about the future of organised life on this planet - and given that I have a very Schopenhaurean disposition (like Schopenhauer, I achieve nirvana in music).

Plus, you know, obviously it's good to have literary allusions as your blog title. Makes you look erudite and all that. 'You can trust me, I've read a poem. Yeah, I'm like doing maths and computer science and technical philosophy and shit, and I've also read a poem. Yeah, I guess I am pretty special' ...

I'm in love with Peter Turchin

Image result for peter turchin

Look at that face... How could you not be in love? War and Peace and War and Ages of Discord are so superb, his mathematical modelling and data analysis are so wonderful and intelligent and so exciting. The Structural-Demographic Theory is a game-changer. What a man!

Thursday 4 May 2017

A Type of Unenlightening ("useless" (crudely)) Analytic Philosophy ("Chmess")

One thing that has come to annoy me about a fair few contemporary debates in epistemology is that they are framed at an excessively high level of abstraction where nothing interesting is actually in question. It is not hard to explain why debates of this kind evolve; they give not very technical philosophers something to do. But the debates seem to me in no way intellectually interesting, and based on silly assumptions about what this sort of inquiry is likely to 'uncover'.
     Here are some examples of this phenomenon, as I see it: the permissivism-'uniquism' debate; the debate about the nature of justification between internalism and externalism; and all kinds of 'evolutionary debunking' arguments. These are pointless and uninteresting debates. With respect to the first, any Bayesian knows that if someone you regard as an 'epistemic peer' or 'epistemic superior' (who has done a similar level of research and has good training, etc) disagrees with you on something, you should probably temper your confidence in your view. Ok, that's it: debate over. There's not like some overarching determinate solution to how to resolve debates; that's a really stupid thought. As for justification, well, heck, justification is not a unitary notion. There's a hell of a lot of work to do in elaborating that point (many people have done it): the point is that it means that some really general debate about the nature of justification is not useful. As for the 'evolutionary debunking' argument applied to morality, we all know that, with a different evolutionary history, we'd have different emotions, blah blah blah. That doesn't mean you can just opt out of properly engaging with meta-ethical debates over the nature of reasons, Parfit's arguments in Part I of On What Matters, etc. You can't just say "Evolution tells us we shouldn't believe in mind-independent evaluative judgments" (like this kind of shit: http://fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/1177/DarwinianDilemma.pdf). Mate, that language is so vague! It's far too slippery. It's cheating to float on this level of abstraction; it's a cop-out from the serious arguments. You haven't shown, e.g., that we can't derive determinate principles from 'veil of ignorance'-type reasoning. Hey, maybe, you're not trying to, but then what are you trying to do? If you're not trying something that ambitious, you've just said some obvious shit that Darwin already said in The Descent of Man: our limbic system was contingently, historically developed. Wow, dude, who gives a shit?
     Oh, and Plantinga's evolutionary debunking argument against naturalism only seems to work at all because it is absurdly vague. It's chock-full of weasel words and really shitty reasoning enabled by an absurd degree of vagueness.

(begun and finished within a philosophy tutorial)

Monday 1 May 2017

Favourite Poems (will probably be sporadically updated (I am very poorly read in poetry))

Plan is to have all of these poems memorised, graven solidly in my head, by the end of this month (May 2017). I have already made major progress; it will be easy.

"Dover Beach" by Matthew Arnold (1867):



The sea is calm tonight. 
The tide is full, the moon lies fair 
Upon the straits; on the French coast the light 
Gleams and is gone; the cliffs of England stand, 
Glimmering and vast, out in the tranquil bay. 
Come to the window, sweet is the night-air! 
Only, from the long line of spray 
Where the sea meets the moon-blanched land, 
Listen! you hear the grating roar 
Of pebbles which the waves draw back, and fling, 
At their return, up the high strand, 
Begin, and cease, and then again begin, 
With tremulous cadence slow, and bring 
The eternal note of sadness in. 

Sophocles long ago 
Heard it on the Ægean, and it brought 
Into his mind the turbid ebb and flow 
Of human misery; we 
Find also in the sound a thought, 
Hearing it by this distant northern sea. 

The Sea of Faith 
Was once, too, at the full, and round earth’s shore 
Lay like the folds of a bright girdle furled. 
But now I only hear 
Its melancholy, long, withdrawing roar, 
Retreating, to the breath 
Of the night-wind, down the vast edges drear 
And naked shingles of the world. 

Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! for the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night.


"Clancy of the Overflow" by A.B. 'Banjo' Patterson (1899): 

I had written him a letter which I had, for want of better
Knowledge, sent to where I met him down the Lachlan, years ago,
He was shearing when I knew him, so I sent the letter to him,
Just `on spec', addressed as follows, `Clancy, of The Overflow'.

And an answer came directed in a writing unexpected,
(And I think the same was written with a thumb-nail dipped in tar)
'Twas his shearing mate who wrote it, and verbatim I will quote it:
`Clancy's gone to Queensland droving, and we don't know where he are.'

In my wild erratic fancy visions come to me of Clancy
Gone a-droving `down the Cooper' where the Western drovers go;
As the stock are slowly stringing, Clancy rides behind them singing,
For the drover's life has pleasures that the townsfolk never know.

And the bush hath friends to meet him, and their kindly voices greet him
In the murmur of the breezes and the river on its bars,
And he sees the vision splendid of the sunlit plains extended,
And at night the wond'rous glory of the everlasting stars.

I am sitting in my dingy little office, where a stingy
Ray of sunlight struggles feebly down between the houses tall,
And the foetid air and gritty of the dusty, dirty city
Through the open window floating, spreads its foulness over all

And in place of lowing cattle, I can hear the fiendish rattle
Of the tramways and the 'buses making hurry down the street,
And the language uninviting of the gutter children fighting,
Comes fitfully and faintly through the ceaseless tramp of feet.

And the hurrying people daunt me, and their pallid faces haunt me
As they shoulder one another in their rush and nervous haste,
With their eager eyes and greedy, and their stunted forms and weedy,
For townsfolk have no time to grow, they have no time to waste.

And I somehow rather fancy that I'd like to change with Clancy,
Like to take a turn at droving where the seasons come and go,
While he faced the round eternal of the cash-book and the journal --

But I doubt he'd suit the office, Clancy, of `The Overflow'.



"The Darkling Thrush" by Thomas Hardy (1900): 

I leant upon a coppice gate
When Frost was spectre-grey,
And Winter's dregs made desolate
    The weakening eye of day.
The tangled bine-stems scored the sky
    Like strings of broken lyres,
And all mankind that haunted nigh
    Had sought their household fires.

The land's sharp features seemed to be
    The Century's corpse outleant,
His crypt the cloudy canopy,
    The wind his death-lament.
The ancient pulse of germ and birth
    Was shrunken hard and dry,
And every spirit upon earth
    Seemed fervourless as I.

At once a voice arose among
    The bleak twigs overhead
In a full-hearted evensong
    Of joy illimited;
An aged thrush, frail, gaunt and small,
    In blast-beruffled plume,
Had chosen thus to fling his soul
    Upon the growing gloom.

So little cause for carolings
    Of such ecstatic sound
Was written on terrestrial things
    Afar or nigh around,
That I could think there trembled through
    His happy good-night air
Some blessed Hope, whereof he knew
    And I was unaware.


"Preludes" by T.S. Eliot (1910-1911): 

I
The winter evening settles down
With smell of steaks in passageways.
Six o’clock.
The burnt-out ends of smoky days.
And now a gusty shower wraps
The grimy scraps
Of withered leaves about your feet
And newspapers from vacant lots;
The showers beat
On broken blinds and chimney-pots,
And at the corner of the street
A lonely cab-horse steams and stamps.

And then the lighting of the lamps.

II
The morning comes to consciousness
Of faint stale smells of beer
From the sawdust-trampled street
With all its muddy feet that press
To early coffee-stands.
With the other masquerades
That time resumes,
One thinks of all the hands
That are raising dingy shades
In a thousand furnished rooms.

III
You tossed a blanket from the bed,
You lay upon your back, and waited;
You dozed, and watched the night revealing
The thousand sordid images
Of which your soul was constituted;
They flickered against the ceiling.
And when all the world came back
And the light crept up between the shutters
And you heard the sparrows in the gutters,
You had such a vision of the street
As the street hardly understands;
Sitting along the bed’s edge, where
You curled the papers from your hair,
Or clasped the yellow soles of feet
In the palms of both soiled hands.

IV
His soul stretched tight across the skies
That fade behind a city block,
Or trampled by insistent feet
At four and five and six o’clock;
And short square fingers stuffing pipes,
And evening newspapers, and eyes
Assured of certain certainties,
The conscience of a blackened street
Impatient to assume the world.

I am moved by fancies that are curled
Around these images, and cling:
The notion of some infinitely gentle
Infinitely suffering thing.

Wipe your hand across your mouth, and laugh;
The worlds revolve like ancient women

Gathering fuel in vacant lots.


"Dulce et Decorum Est" by Wilfred Owen (1917):

Bent double, like old beggars under sacks,
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge,
Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs,
And towards our distant rest began to trudge.
Men marched asleep. Many had lost their boots,
But limped on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind;
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots
Of gas-shells dropping softly behind.

Gas! GAS! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of fumbling
Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time,
But someone still was yelling out and stumbling
And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime.—
Dim through the misty panes and thick green light,
As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.

In all my dreams before my helpless sight,
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, drowning.

If in some smothering dreams, you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,—
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est
Pro patria mori.


"Futility" by Wilfred Owen (1918):

Move him into the sun—
Gently its touch awoke him once,
At home, whispering of fields half-sown.
Always it woke him, even in France,
Until this morning and this snow.
If anything might rouse him now
The kind old sun will know.

Think how it wakes the seeds—
Woke once the clays of a cold star.
Are limbs, so dear-achieved, are sides
Full-nerved, still warm, too hard to stir?
Was it for this the clay grew tall?
—O what made fatuous sunbeams toil
To break earth's sleep at all?


"The Second Coming" by William Butler Yeats (1919):

 Turning and turning in the widening gyre
 The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
 Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
 Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
 The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
 The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
 The best lack all conviction, while the worst
 Are full of passionate intensity.

 Surely some revelation is at hand;
 Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
 The Second Coming! Hardly are those words out
 When a vast image out of Spiritus Mundi
 Troubles my sight: a waste of desert sand;
 A shape with lion body and the head of a man,
 A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
 Is moving its slow thighs, while all about it
 Wind shadows of the indignant desert birds.

 The darkness drops again but now I know
 That twenty centuries of stony sleep
 Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking cradle,
 And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
 Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born?


"Rhapsody on a Windy Night" by T.S. Eliot (1920):

Twelve o'clock.
Along the reaches of the street
Held in a lunar synthesis,
Whispering lunar incantations
Dissolve the floors of memory
And all its clear relations,
Its divisions and precisions,
Every street lamp that I pass
Beats like a fatalistic drum,
And through the spaces of the dark
Midnight shakes the memory
As a madman shakes a dead geranium.

Half-past one,
The street lamp sputtered,
The street lamp muttered,
The street lamp said, "Regard that woman
Who hesitates towards you in the light of the door
Which opens on her like a grin.
You see the border of her dress
Is torn and stained with sand,
And you see the corner of her eye
Twists like a crooked pin."

The memory throws up high and dry
A crowd of twisted things;
A twisted branch upon the beach
Eaten smooth, and polished
As if the world gave up
The secret of its skeleton,
Stiff and white.
A broken spring in a factory yard,
Rust that clings to the form that the strength has left
Hard and curled and ready to snap.

Half-past two,
The street lamp said,
"Remark the cat which flattens itself in the gutter,
Slips out its tongue
And devours a morsel of rancid butter."
So the hand of a child, automatic,
Slipped out and pocketed a toy that was running along the quay.
I could see nothing behind that child's eye.
I have seen eyes in the street
Trying to peer through lighted shutters,
And a crab one afternoon in a pool,
An old crab with barnacles on his back,
Gripped the end of a stick which I held him.

Half-past three,
The lamp sputtered,
The lamp muttered in the dark.

The lamp hummed:
"Regard the moon,
La lune ne garde aucune rancune,
She winks a feeble eye,
She smiles into corners.
She smoothes the hair of the grass.
The moon has lost her memory.
A washed-out smallpox cracks her face,
Her hand twists a paper rose,
That smells of dust and old Cologne,
She is alone
With all the old nocturnal smells
That cross and cross across her brain."
The reminiscence comes
Of sunless dry geraniums
And dust in crevices,
Smells of chestnuts in the streets,
And female smells in shuttered rooms,
And cigarettes in corridors
And cocktail smells in bars."

The lamp said,
"Four o'clock,
Here is the number on the door.
Memory!
You have the key,
The little lamp spreads a ring on the stair,
Mount.
The bed is open; the tooth-brush hangs on the wall,
Put your shoes at the door, sleep, prepare for life."

The last twist of the knife.


"The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock" by T.S. Eliot (1920):

S’io credesse che mia risposta fosse
A persona che mai tornasse al mondo,
Questa fiamma staria senza piu scosse.
Ma percioche giammai di questo fondo
Non torno vivo alcun, s’i’odo il vero,
Senza tema d’infamia ti rispondo.
Let us go then, you and I,
When the evening is spread out against the sky
Like a patient etherized upon a table;
Let us go, through certain half-deserted streets,
The muttering retreats
Of restless nights in one-night cheap hotels
And sawdust restaurants with oyster-shells:
Streets that follow like a tedious argument
Of insidious intent
To lead you to an overwhelming question ...
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.

In the room the women come and go
Talking of Michelangelo.

The yellow fog that rubs its back upon the window-panes,
The yellow smoke that rubs its muzzle on the window-panes,
Licked its tongue into the corners of the evening,
Lingered upon the pools that stand in drains,
Let fall upon its back the soot that falls from chimneys,
Slipped by the terrace, made a sudden leap,
And seeing that it was a soft October night,
Curled once about the house, and fell asleep.

And indeed there will be time
For the yellow smoke that slides along the street,
Rubbing its back upon the window-panes;
There will be time, there will be time
To prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet;
There will be time to murder and create,
And time for all the works and days of hands
That lift and drop a question on your plate;
Time for you and time for me,
And time yet for a hundred indecisions,
And for a hundred visions and revisions,
Before the taking of a toast and tea.

In the room the women come and go
Talking of Michelangelo.

And indeed there will be time
To wonder, “Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?”
Time to turn back and descend the stair,
With a bald spot in the middle of my hair —
(They will say: “How his hair is growing thin!”)
My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin,
My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin —
(They will say: “But how his arms and legs are thin!”)
Do I dare
Disturb the universe?
In a minute there is time
For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.

For I have known them all already, known them all:
Have known the evenings, mornings, afternoons,
I have measured out my life with coffee spoons;
I know the voices dying with a dying fall
Beneath the music from a farther room.
               So how should I presume?

And I have known the eyes already, known them all—
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?
               And how should I presume?

And I have known the arms already, known them all—
Arms that are braceleted and white and bare
(But in the lamplight, downed with light brown hair!)
Is it perfume from a dress
That makes me so digress?
Arms that lie along a table, or wrap about a shawl.
               And should I then presume?
               And how should I begin?

Shall I say, I have gone at dusk through narrow streets
And watched the smoke that rises from the pipes
Of lonely men in shirt-sleeves, leaning out of windows? ...

I should have been a pair of ragged claws
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas.

And the afternoon, the evening, sleeps so peacefully!
Smoothed by long fingers,
Asleep ... tired ... or it malingers,
Stretched on the floor, here beside you and me.
Should I, after tea and cakes and ices,
Have the strength to force the moment to its crisis?
But though I have wept and fasted, wept and prayed,
Though I have seen my head (grown slightly bald) brought in upon a platter,
I am no prophet — and here’s no great matter;
I have seen the moment of my greatness flicker,
And I have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, and snicker,
And in short, I was afraid.

And would it have been worth it, after all,
After the cups, the marmalade, the tea,
Among the porcelain, among some talk of you and me,
Would it have been worth while,
To have bitten off the matter with a smile,
To have squeezed the universe into a ball
To roll it towards some overwhelming question,
To say: “I am Lazarus, come from the dead,
Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all”—
If one, settling a pillow by her head
               Should say: “That is not what I meant at all;
               That is not it, at all.”

And would it have been worth it, after all,
Would it have been worth while,
After the sunsets and the dooryards and the sprinkled streets,
After the novels, after the teacups, after the skirts that trail along the floor—
And this, and so much more?—
It is impossible to say just what I mean!
But as if a magic lantern threw the nerves in patterns on a screen:
Would it have been worth while
If one, settling a pillow or throwing off a shawl,
And turning toward the window, should say:
               “That is not it at all,
               That is not what I meant, at all.”

No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two,
Advise the prince; no doubt, an easy tool,
Deferential, glad to be of use,
Politic, cautious, and meticulous;
Full of high sentence, but a bit obtuse;
At times, indeed, almost ridiculous—
Almost, at times, the Fool.

I grow old ... I grow old ...
I shall wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled.

Shall I part my hair behind?   Do I dare to eat a peach?
I shall wear white flannel trousers, and walk upon the beach.
I have heard the mermaids singing, each to each.

I do not think that they will sing to me.

I have seen them riding seaward on the waves
Combing the white hair of the waves blown back
When the wind blows the water white and black.
We have lingered in the chambers of the sea
By sea-girls wreathed with seaweed red and brown

Till human voices wake us, and we drown.


"Gubbinal" by Wallace Stevens (1923):

That strange flower, the sun,
Is just what you say.
Have it your way.

The world is ugly,
And the people are sad.

That tuft of jungle feathers,
That animal eye,
Is just what you say.

That savage of fire,
That seed,
Have it your way.

The world is ugly,
And the people are sad.


"The Hollow Men" by T.S. Eliot (1925):

Mistah Kurtz—he dead.

A penny for the Old Guy

I
We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
Our dried voices, when
We whisper together
Are quiet and meaningless
As wind in dry grass
Or rats' feet over broken glass
In our dry cellar

Shape without form, shade without colour,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion;

Those who have crossed
With direct eyes, to death's other Kingdom
Remember us—if at all—not as lost
Violent souls, but only
As the hollow men
The stuffed men.

II
Eyes I dare not meet in dreams
In death's dream kingdom
These do not appear:
There, the eyes are
Sunlight on a broken column
There, is a tree swinging
And voices are
In the wind's singing
More distant and more solemn
Than a fading star.

Let me be no nearer
In death's dream kingdom
Let me also wear
Such deliberate disguises
Rat's coat, crowskin, crossed staves
In a field
Behaving as the wind behaves
No nearer—

Not that final meeting
In the twilight kingdom

III
This is the dead land
This is cactus land
Here the stone images
Are raised, here they receive
The supplication of a dead man's hand
Under the twinkle of a fading star.

Is it like this
In death's other kingdom
Waking alone
At the hour when we are
Trembling with tenderness
Lips that would kiss
Form prayers to broken stone.

IV
The eyes are not here
There are no eyes here
In this valley of dying stars
In this hollow valley
This broken jaw of our lost kingdoms

In this last of meeting places
We grope together
And avoid speech
Gathered on this beach of the tumid river

Sightless, unless
The eyes reappear
As the perpetual star
Multifoliate rose
Of death's twilight kingdom
The hope only
Of empty men.

V
Here we go round the prickly pear
Prickly pear prickly pear
Here we go round the prickly pear
At five o'clock in the morning.

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow
For Thine is the Kingdom

Between the conception
And the creation
Between the emotion
And the response
Falls the Shadow
Life is very long

Between the desire
And the spasm
Between the potency
And the existence
Between the essence
And the descent
Falls the Shadow
For Thine is the Kingdom

For Thine is
Life is
For Thine is the

This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper.


"The Wasteland" by T.S. Eliot (1925)


[untitled] by e.e. cummings (1926):

"next to of course god america i
love you land of the pilgrims' and so forth oh
say can you see by the dawn's early my
country 'tis of centuries come and go
and are no more what of it we should worry
in every language even deafanddumb
thy sons acclaim your glorious name by gorry
by jingo by gee by gosh by gum
why talk of beauty what could be more beaut-
iful than these heroic happy dead
who rushed like lions to the roaring slaughter
they did not stop to think they died instead
then shall the voice of liberty be mute?"
He spoke. And drank rapidly a glass of water


"For the Union Dead" (1964) by Robert Lowell: 

The old South Boston Aquarium stands
in a Sahara of snow now. Its broken windows are boarded. 
The bronze weathervane cod has lost half its scales.
The airy tanks are dry.

Once my nose crawled like a snail on the glass;
my hand tingled
to burst the bubbles
drifting from the noses of the cowed, compliant fish.

My hand draws back. I often sigh still
for the dark downward and vegetating kingdom
of the fish and reptile. One morning last March,
I pressed against the new barbed and galvanized

fence on the Boston Common. Behind their cage,
yellow dinosaur steamshovels were grunting 
as they cropped up tons of mush and grass
to gouge their underworld garage.

Parking spaces luxuriate like civic
sandpiles in the heart of Boston.
A girdle of orange, Puritan-pumpkin colored girders
braces the tingling Statehouse,

shaking over the excavations, as it faces Colonel Shaw
and his bell-cheeked Negro infantry
on St. Gaudens' shaking Civil War relief,
propped by a plank splint against the garage's earthquake.

Two months after marching through Boston,
half the regiment was dead;
at the dedication,
William James could almost hear the bronze Negroes breathe.

Their monument sticks like a fishbone
in the city's throat.
Its Colonel is as lean
as a compass-needle.

He has an angry wrenlike vigilance,
a greyhound's gentle tautness;
he seems to wince at pleasure,
and suffocate for privacy.

He is out of bounds now. He rejoices in man's lovely,
peculiar power to choose life and die—
when he leads his black soldiers to death,
he cannot bend his back.

On a thousand small town New England greens,
the old white churches hold their air
of sparse, sincere rebellion; frayed flags
quilt the graveyards of the Grand Army of the Republic.

The stone statues of the abstract Union Soldier
grow slimmer and younger each year—
wasp-waisted, they doze over muskets
and muse through their sideburns . . .

Shaw's father wanted no monument
except the ditch,
where his son's body was thrown
and lost with his "niggers."

The ditch is nearer.
There are no statues for the last war here;
on Boylston Street, a commercial photograph 
shows Hiroshima boiling

over a Mosler Safe, the "Rock of Ages"
that survived the blast. Space is nearer.
When I crouch to my television set,
the drained faces of Negro school-children rise like balloons.

Colonel Shaw
is riding on his bubble,
he waits
for the blessèd break.

The Aquarium is gone. Everywhere,
giant finned cars nose forward like fish;
a savage servility
slides by on grease.


"For Sale" by Robert Lowell (?): 

Poor sheepish plaything,
organized with prodigal animosity,
lived in just a year –
my Father's cottage at Beverly Farm was on the market the month he died.
Empty, open, intimate,
its town-house furniture
had an on tiptoe air
of waiting for the mover
on the heels of the undertaker.
Ready, afraid
of living alone till eighty,
Mother mooned in a window,
as if she had stayed on a train
one stop past her destination.


"Tulips" by Sylvia Plath (1961):

The tulips are too excitable, it is winter here. 
Look how white everything is, how quiet, how snowed-in.   
I am learning peacefulness, lying by myself quietly 
As the light lies on these white walls, this bed, these hands.   
I am nobody; I have nothing to do with explosions.   
I have given my name and my day-clothes up to the nurses   
And my history to the anesthetist and my body to surgeons. 

They have propped my head between the pillow and the sheet-cuff   
Like an eye between two white lids that will not shut. 
Stupid pupil, it has to take everything in. 
The nurses pass and pass, they are no trouble, 
They pass the way gulls pass inland in their white caps, 
Doing things with their hands, one just the same as another,   
So it is impossible to tell how many there are. 

My body is a pebble to them, they tend it as water 
Tends to the pebbles it must run over, smoothing them gently. 
They bring me numbness in their bright needles, they bring me sleep.   
Now I have lost myself I am sick of baggage—— 
My patent leather overnight case like a black pillbox,   
My husband and child smiling out of the family photo;   
Their smiles catch onto my skin, little smiling hooks. 

I have let things slip, a thirty-year-old cargo boat   
stubbornly hanging on to my name and address. 
They have swabbed me clear of my loving associations.   
Scared and bare on the green plastic-pillowed trolley   
I watched my teaset, my bureaus of linen, my books   
Sink out of sight, and the water went over my head.   
I am a nun now, I have never been so pure. 

I didn’t want any flowers, I only wanted 
To lie with my hands turned up and be utterly empty. 
How free it is, you have no idea how free—— 
The peacefulness is so big it dazes you, 
And it asks nothing, a name tag, a few trinkets. 
It is what the dead close on, finally; I imagine them   
Shutting their mouths on it, like a Communion tablet.   

The tulips are too red in the first place, they hurt me. 
Even through the gift paper I could hear them breathe   
Lightly, through their white swaddlings, like an awful baby.   
Their redness talks to my wound, it corresponds. 
They are subtle : they seem to float, though they weigh me down,   
Upsetting me with their sudden tongues and their color,   
A dozen red lead sinkers round my neck. 

Nobody watched me before, now I am watched.   
The tulips turn to me, and the window behind me 
Where once a day the light slowly widens and slowly thins,   
And I see myself, flat, ridiculous, a cut-paper shadow   
Between the eye of the sun and the eyes of the tulips,   
And I have no face, I have wanted to efface myself.   
The vivid tulips eat my oxygen. 

Before they came the air was calm enough, 
Coming and going, breath by breath, without any fuss.   
Then the tulips filled it up like a loud noise. 
Now the air snags and eddies round them the way a river   
Snags and eddies round a sunken rust-red engine.   
They concentrate my attention, that was happy   
Playing and resting without committing itself. 

The walls, also, seem to be warming themselves. 
The tulips should be behind bars like dangerous animals;   
They are opening like the mouth of some great African cat,   
And I am aware of my heart: it opens and closes 
Its bowl of red blooms out of sheer love of me. 
The water I taste is warm and salt, like the sea, 
And comes from a country far away as health.


"Digging" by Seamus Heaney (1961)

Between my finger and my thumb   
The squat pen rests; snug as a gun. 

Under my window, a clean rasping sound   
When the spade sinks into gravelly ground:   
My father, digging. I look down 

Till his straining rump among the flowerbeds   
Bends low, comes up twenty years away   
Stooping in rhythm through potato drills   
Where he was digging. 

The coarse boot nestled on the lug, the shaft   
Against the inside knee was levered firmly. 
He rooted out tall tops, buried the bright edge deep 
To scatter new potatoes that we picked, 
Loving their cool hardness in our hands. 

By God, the old man could handle a spade.   
Just like his old man. 

My grandfather cut more turf in a day 
Than any other man on Toner’s bog. 
Once I carried him milk in a bottle 
Corked sloppily with paper. He straightened up 
To drink it, then fell to right away 
Nicking and slicing neatly, heaving sods 
Over his shoulder, going down and down 
For the good turf. Digging. 

The cold smell of potato mould, the squelch and slap 
Of soggy peat, the curt cuts of an edge 
Through living roots awaken in my head. 
But I’ve no spade to follow men like them. 

Between my finger and my thumb 
The squat pen rests. 
I’ll dig with it.

First update: 
"This Be The Verse" (1971) by Philip Larkin

They fuck you up, your mum and dad.   
    They may not mean to, but they do.   
They fill you with the faults they had
    And add some extra, just for you.

But they were fucked up in their turn
    By fools in old-style hats and coats,   
Who half the time were soppy-stern
    And half at one another’s throats.

Man hands on misery to man.
    It deepens like a coastal shelf.
Get out as early as you can,
    And don’t have any kids yourself.